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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000514

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PINR](#) [NATO](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA: ROGOZIN SAYS MOSCOW REMAINS
SKEPTICAL OF COOPERATING WITH NATO

REF: A. USNATO 506
[1](#)B. USNATO 400

Classified By: Ambassador Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin explained to NATO PermReps on November 9 his difficulty in dealing with Moscow's skepticism regarding cooperation with NATO, and how he intended to overcome this situation by inviting high-level Russian officials and experts to take part in NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meetings. Rogozin admitted that he had problems with the Russian MOD, which was particularly averse to substantive cooperation with NATO. Rogozin said that he would attend a November 23 GOR interagency meeting on NATO, at which he claimed he would advocate for enhanced cooperation. Rogozin thought the NATO Secretary General's December visit to Moscow offered opportunities to advance NATO-Russia relations, and advised that the SecGen meet both official and non-official Russians. PermReps advised Rogozin to focus on immediate, practical results for the NRC that could demonstrate real progress in the relationship. End summary.

Moscow Skeptical) Need More Visits to NATO?

[1](#)2. (C) Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin used a November 9 lunch hosted by the Italian PermRep to indicate his difficulties in dealing with Moscow regarding cooperation with NATO. Ambassador Daalder and the French, German, Czech, Norwegian and Canadian PermReps were also in attendance. Rogozin said that Moscow remained skeptical of Russian cooperation with NATO, and he proposed holding more reinforced NRC Ambassadorial meetings attended by experts from capitals to increase understanding. He thought such visits by Russian officials would make them more aware of the NRC's potential and of the possibilities offered by enhanced NATO-Russia ties.

[1](#)3. (C) Rogozin gave the example of a proposed NRC joint review of common threats, saying a discussion by experts from capitals of the various threats facing NATO and Russia could be a means to determine areas for cooperation (ref A). He also proposed that MFA Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov and his American counterpart brief the NRC on the START negotiations, FSB Deputy Director for International Cooperation participate in a NRC meeting on terrorism, and the director of the Russian counter-narcotics service participate in a meeting on the threat from Afghan narcotics. NATO PermReps said they recognized the benefit in having

experts from capitals participate in NRC Ambassadorials, but argued that reinforced meetings should not be the norm.

¶4. (C) Rogozin said that he had a "real problem" with the Russian MOD, which remained especially wary of NATO. He had convinced the Minister of Defense to agree to minimal cooperation consisting of military-technical cooperation (i.e. military sales), sharing experience in military medicine, logistical cooperation, and offering language training at Russian schools for ISAF.

Where to Cooperate

¶5. (C) Rogozin thought that Afghanistan and counter-piracy were good areas in which to expand cooperation, but said Moscow was particularly interested in energy and cyber security, and Arctic issues. He thought that further progress in the U.S.-Russia relationship would make Moscow more receptive to advancing NATO-Russia ties. Rogozin highlighted a number of issues he thought the NRC itself should address, including a Treaty on European Security and missile defense, while lamenting that the volume of substantive cooperation in the NRC was disappointing. He noted that there were only four specific areas for cooperation in the draft NRC Military Committee work plan for ¶2010.

¶6. (C) NATO PermReps advised Rogozin against turning the NRC into a talking shop, urging that the NRC instead focus on practical areas of cooperation that would demonstrate real

USNATO 00000514 002 OF 002

progress in the near term. The PermReps were quick to point out that ongoing Russian inability to agree to cooperate in most of the specific areas under consideration was the reason for the limited practical cooperation in the NRC. They agreed that MD offered a fruitful area for cooperation, but noted that Russia recently removed Afghanistan and naval cooperation from military work plan.

¶7. (C) Rogozin explained that on November 23 he would attend a GOR interagency meeting on NATO, at which he would advocate for expanded cooperation.

SecGen's Visit to Moscow

¶8. (C) Rogozin explained that despite Russian skepticism, Moscow maintained a positive attitude toward Secretary General Rasmussen's initiative to enhance NATO-Russia ties (ref B). He thought the SecGen's planned December 15-17 visit to Moscow an opportunity to highlight NATO-Russia relations, and hoped that the SecGen would meet with the Russian think-tank community and media, as well as GOR officials.
DAALDER